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case and the agricultural cooperative movement. The requirement that
cooperatives be fair competitors certainly is not an unreasonable one,
The decision, along with the natural evolution thereof, it is submitted,
will insure the long run welfare of consumers, competitors, and the
producer-members of agricultural cooperatives. The privileges of agri-
cultural cooperation's infancy have been supplemented-not eradicated-
by the responsibility of its maturity.
P. G. LAKE-ITS EFFECT ON A CONVEYANCE BY THE LESSOR
OF A LEASE BONUS WITH A RETAINED ROYALTY
When a landowner conveys the mineral rights of his land to a pro-
ducer, it has become common for him to demand and to receive, in addi-
tion to a royalty interest in the minerals in place, a cash bonus in con-
sideration for the grant.1 Frequently, the cash bonus is not paid in a
lump sum on execution of the grant, but is extended over several years
in periodic installments.2 If after the execution of the lease, the lessor
wishes to dispose of part, but not all of his interest in the lease, the man-
ner of disposition must be carefully planned in order to avoid seriously
adverse tax consequences. The lessor wants to be certain that the grant
he makes will be regarded as the conveyance of a property interest. Thus,
the result will be capital gain in the event of a sale,3 and he will not be
regarded as having made an anticipatory assignment of income in the
event of a gift.' In order to ascertain with any degree of certainty the
probable tax consequences of a conveyance, for consideration or as a
gift, of such interests in oil and gas leases, it may be helpful to deter-
mine their character as "property." Whether a royalty and lease bonus
1. See Beveridge, The Federal Income Tax on Assignments of Oil & Gas Leases,
34 CALIF. L. REv. 117 (1946). The payment received by a lessor for granting a lease
is generally called a "lease bonus." See, e.g., Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404
(1940) ; Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932) ; G.C.M. 22730, 1940-1 Coau. BULL. 214;
Wellen, Recent Development in the Taxation of Oil and Gas Interests-Recent Decisions
and Rulings, SIXTH ANN. INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 479, 483 (1955).
2. See MILLER, OIL AND GAS FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 231-33 (3d ed. 1957). "In
recent years it has become the practice for a landowner to lease his land for oil and gas
for a bonus, payable not in one sum but in a series of installments, evidenced only by a
contract." Fiske, Tax Problems of Estates Owning Oil & Gas Properties, 13 OKLA. L.
REv. 267, 273 (1960).
3. J. D. Reynolds, 10 B.T.A. 651 (1928), acq. VII-2 Cu. BULL. 34 (1928); J. E.
Murphy, 9 B.T.A. 610 (1927), acq., VII-2 Cum. BULL. 28 (1928); G.C.M. 12118, XII-2
Coa. BULL. 119 (1933) ; I.T. 2524, IX-1 Cum. BULL. 199 (1930).
4. See, e.g., Lester A. Nordan, 22 T.C. 1132 (1954), nonacq., 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 11,
withdrawn, acq. in result only, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 4; R. E. Nail, 29 B.T.A. 33 (1932),
nonacq., 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 6.
NOTES
interest created out of the same lease agreement are a single integrated
property or two separate and independent interests may be determinative
of the tax treatment which will be afforded the various methods em-
ployed to effect their transfer.
ROYALTY-TAX CONSEQUENCES ON ACQUISITION
A royalty is a share of the product or profit reserved by the owner
for permitting another to use the land. It is compensation for the priv-
ilege of drilling and producing oil and gas.' The word "royalty" has no
technical or commercial meaning different from its ordinary and normal
meaning.' Royalties are reserved by landowners or created by agreement
and are not charged with the costs of operating the oil or gas wells.7
They are interests in wasting assets which will eventually become value-
less. Therefore, royalties are subject to depletion.8  Royalty rights rep-
resent a share in all of the oil or mineral in place.' Royalties are not paid
for time but for oil and gas taken out, and represent an actual removal
and disposition of the contents of the soil.'" The plain royalty is the
customary one-eighth or one-sixth interest reserved by the landowner up-
on the execution of a lease." Royalty interests may be perpetual in dura-
tion, may have the same duration as an existing lease, may be for a fixed
term without provision for extension, or may continue for a stated term
and "so long thereafter as oil and gas is produced upon the premises" in
paying quantities.'
Whenever the landowner retains a royalty interest in the property,
the transaction is treated as a lease for tax purposes," and the royalties
are taxed as ordinary income when received,'" subject to depletion
5. J.T. Sneed, Jr., 30 B.T.A. 1121 (1934), mwdified by 33 B.T.A. 478 (1935).
6. Kiesau Petroleum Corp., 42 B.T.A. 69 (1940), acq., 1940-2 Cum. BULL. 4.
7. Stevens, Royalty Interest-A Depletable Asset, 35 L. A. BAR BULL. 298 (1960).
8. INT. REv. CODE or 1954, § 613.
9. G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 Cutm. BULL. 214.
10. Wilson v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1935).
11. See Williams, Assignment of Leasehold, Royalty & Oil Payment, SECOND ANN.
INsT. oN OIL AND GAs LAW AND TAXATION 469, 488 (1951) ; Comment, Federal Taxa-
tion-Sale of Caeved Out Oil Payments, 30 RocKY MT. L. REv. 54 (1957).
12. See Martz and Hames, Implied Rights of Royalty Owners, 30 RocKy MT. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1957).
13. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932); G.C.M. 27322, 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 62;
Bruen, Federal Income Tax Aspects of Oil & Gas Ventures-A Summary for the
Investor, 14 TAX L. B.Ev. 505, 519-20 (1959).
14. INT. B.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a) (6). Payments to the lessor are payable
solely out of production by the lessee. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931). See
Benjamin, Recent Developments In the Field of Taxation Affecting Oil & Gas Trans-
actions, 32 TUL. L. REv., 607, 612 (1958). But if the landowner does not retain an eco-
nomic interest in the oil or gas in place, the payments received will be treated as sales
proceeds subject to capital gains of the excess over basis. Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land
Dev. Co., 303 U.S. 372 (1938) ; Bruen, supra note 13, at 520.
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allowances.' 5
LEASE BONUS-TAX CONSEQUENCES ON ACQUISITION
Cash received by a lessor at the time of execution of a mineral lease
is a "bonus" to him in consideration for his entering into the lease. A
bonus is the consideration paid by the lessee for the right which he ac-
quires to enter upon and use the land for the purpose of exploring it.' It
constitutes payment for the right to extract all the minerals in the tract
leased and is not allocable to any particular unit or number of units. By
the payment of a bonus, the lessee is considered to that extent to have
substituted his capital for that of the lessor. Thus, the bonus paid upon
execution of the lease is not consideration for the sale of oil and gas in
place, but is regarded by the courts as advance royalty income, which is
not dependent upon production.' Therefore, like royalties, the lease
bonus is ordinary income, subject to depletion,"8 and its character as such
does not change when it is deferred over several installment periods.'
THE DEFINITION OF PROPERTY
The term "property" means each separate interest owned by the tax-
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 611.
16. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932). Bonus payments should be distinguished
from "delay rentals." The delay rentals on oil and gas leases are rents. They are not
paid directly or indirectly for oil to be produced, but are for additional time in which
to utilize the land. They accrue by the mere lapse of time. See Houston Farms Dev. Co.
v. United States, 131 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1942) ; G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 214.
"A delay rental is an amount paid for the privilege of deferring development of the
property and which could have been avoided by abandonment of the lease, or by com-
mencement of development, operations, or by obtaining production." Treas. Reg., § 612-
3(c) (1956). See Freling, Bonus or Delay Rental-Their Distinction for Tax Purposes
and the Jefferson Lake Case, 35 TEXAS L. REV. 211, 213-27 (1956). Delay rentals are
not depletable income. See Ervin, The Bosnues, Minimum Royalties and Delay Rentals,
FIFTH ANN. INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 529, 557 (1954).
17. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940) ; Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655
(1937) ; Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933) ; Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S.
299 (1932) ; Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932) ; G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 Cum. BULL.
214. See MILLER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 150-51.
18. Ibid.; G.C.M. 27322, 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 62. See Benjamin, supra note 14 at
610-12. Not all bonuses are depletable, but only those which are accompanied by a
reserved royalty or other economic interest in the minerals in place. Bankers Mortgage
Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1944), aff'g. 1 T.C. 698 (1943). Thus,
although the allowance of depletion to the lessor on - bonus payment is not dependent
upon production of oil or gas in the year claimed, where the lease expires, terminates or
is abandoned without production, the depletion taken must be restored to income in that
year. See Hughes, Restoration of Depletion on Bonus Payments By a Landowner Under
an Oil and Gas Lease, 39 TEXAS L. REv. 271 (1961).
19. See, e.g., Alice G. K. Kleberg, 43 B.T.A. 277 (1941). Where a lessor on the
cash basis is entitled by contract to receive installment bonus payments, such payments
become income to him only as they are received, provided he has received only the
contractual obligation of the lessee to pay, unaccompanied by a promissory note or
other evidence of indebtedness. Alice G. K. Kleberg, supra. See Note, Recognition of
Gah on The Sale of Realt3y--The Closed Transaction Test, 36 IND. L.J. 216 (1961).
NOTES
payer in each mineral deposit in each separate tract or parcel of land."
Apparently, it is not impossible for a lessor to own two or more interests
in a single tract of land. G.C.M. 22106 21 states:
If a taxpayer holds several interests in the same tract or parcel,
each interest is a "property" . . . .
Accordingly, the term "property" may be defined as each
separate interest owned by the taxpayer in each separate tract
or parcel of land.
It has been held that where a lessor executed an oil and gas lease in a
certain tract reserving both royalties and an oil payment, sale of the oil
payment was the sale of a capital asset.2 Thus, the royalty interest and
the oil payment constituted two separate property interests. The fol-
lowing combinations of interests owned by the same person in the same
tract have also been held to constitute separate properties: a working in-
terest and an oil payment ;23 a working interest and a royalty interest.24
In the Herndon Drilling Co." case, the Tax Court stated: "the two
interests [a working interest and an oil payment] in each lease must be
held to be two properties . . . [because] they are inherently separate and
different in character."
Thus, where the interests owned by the taxpayer are inherently
different in character, the courts will probably hold that the
taxpayer owns two separate interests. On the other hand,
where the taxpayer owns interests which are not inherently dif-
ferent in character, as for example portions of the same type
of interest acquired at different times or from different
owners, . . . there [may] be a merger of interests.2"
The necessity, from a tax standpoint, for drawing thes& property
distinctions is obvious. An irrevocable assignment by the assignor of
his total interest in property constitutes the transfer of a capital asset27
20. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 614(a); G.C.M. 24094, 1944 Cum. BULL. 250;
G.C.M. 22106, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 245. See generally French, The Oil and Gas Property
and Aggregation, 36 TEXAs L. REv. 745 (1958).
21. 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 245, 247. See also G.C.M. 22332, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 228, 230.
22. R. B. Cowden, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mene. 475 (1955).
23. Herndon Drilling Co., 6 T.C. 628 (1946), nonacq., 1946-2 Cum. BULL. 6.
24. Helvering v. Jewel Mining Co., 126 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1942); Badger Oil Co.
v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 634 (1941). But
see Mascot Oil Co., 29 B.T.A. 652 (1933), petition to review order dismissed, 75 F.2d
1009 (9th Cir. 1935), which it is believed was erroneously decided. See French, supra
note 20.
25. 6 T.C. 628, 637 (1946).
26. French, supra note 20, at 751. "The spirit of the 1954 Code and the . . .
Regulations apparently is to find the smallest possible unit." Id. at 747.
27. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
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under section 1221 of the Code.2' However, assignments which convey
no property rights, but have the effect of shifting the assignor's income
in anticipation of its receipt, whether or not for consideration, are clearly
not capital transactions. 9 Our inquiry is, therefore, now directed to the
determination of whether royalty and lease bonus interests are so "in-
herently separate and different in character""0 as to constitute separate
properties, so that the sale of one and the retention of the other will be a
capital transaction, and thus, not an anticipatory assignment of income.
CONVEYANCE OF ROYALTY WITH RETAINED LEASE BONUS
If the conveyance divests the assignor of all his interests in the
property, capital gain will be recognized. 3 The sale of an oil payment
"carved-out" 2 of a royalty or larger oil payment, however, is equivalent
to an advance sale of oil and results in ordinary income subject to de-
pletion.3" The assignor may also convey part of his retained royalty for
its full life. Such a conveyance is a "vertical slice," which qualifies as a
capital transaction and is not a carve-out. Thus, the transfer of an un-
divided or fractional interest in a royalty where no lease bonus is re-
tained is a "vertical slice" and undoubtedly the transfer of a property
interest."
28. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221.
29. See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
30. Herndon Drilling Co., 6 T. C. 628, 637 (1946).
31. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) ; G.C.M. 12118, XII-2 Cui! BULL. 119.
32. An oil payment is the right to a specified sum of money payable out of a
specified percentage of oil, or the proceeds received from the sale of such oil when
produced. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940); Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S.
655 (1937). A "carved-out" oil payment is one which runs for a period shorter than the
life of the interest from which it is carved. See FISKE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF OIL AND
GAS TRANSACTION § 9.06 (1959).
33. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); I. T. 3895, 1948-1
Cum. BULL., 39; G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 66; G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 Cui!. BULL.
214. See text accompanying notes 60-66, infra.
34. The sale of such an interest will qualify for capital gains treatment. J. D.
Reynolds, 10 B.T.A. 651 (1928), acq., VII-2 Cuir. BULL. 34 (1928); J. E. Murphy, 9
B.T.A. 610 (1927), acq., VII-2 Cum. BULL. 28 (1928) ; G.C.M. 12118, XII-2 Cuir. BULL.
119 (1933) ; I.T. 2524, IX-1 Cui. BULL. 199 (1930). See MILLER, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 154-55. A gift of such an interest will be effective to exclude the payments by the
lessee from the donor-lessor's gross income. Lester A. Nordan, 22 T.C. 1132 (1954),
vonacq., 1955-2 (Cum. BULL. 11 withdrawn, acq. in result only, 1959-1 Cui!. BULL. 4;
R.E. Nail, 27 B.T.A. 33 (1932), nonacq., 1949-1 Cui. BULL. 6. However, the donative
assignment of a carved-out oil payment is an anticipatory assignment of income, which
will be taxed to the donor as the payments are received by the donee, and are excluded
from the donee's income. Eugene T. Flewellen, 32 T.C. 317 (1959) ; I.T. 3935, 1949-1
Cui,. BULL. 39. See MILLER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 197-99. If the donee qualifies as
a charitable organization within the scope of section 170(c) of the Code, the donor
may, in computing his taxable income, take a deduction in an amount equal to the fair
market value of the donated interest. Eugene T. Flewellen, supra; Treas. Reg. §
1.170-1(b) (1955). The deduction is subject to the ordinary limitations on deductions
for charitable contributions. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(b).
NOTES
In J. M. Hudson,35 a small cash bonus had in fact been received prior
to conveyance of the royalty interest, which was held to be a conveyance
of a property interest. Although in Mary F. Waggoner36 there was no
discussion of carve-outs by the Tax Court, it seems that on the basis of
the decision it can be justifiably implied that the lease bonus interests
there were recognized as individual property interests, separate from the
royalties. The conveyance of such interests in whole, or any fractional
part-vertical slice-would not, and in the Waggoner case did not,
constitute a carve-out. There can be a carve-out only where an in-
terest of lesser quality is created out of a larger continuing property
interest."
Where the lessor has received a lease bonus along with his reserved
royalty interest upon execution of a lease, it may be argued that the lease
bonus is an integral part of the royalty interest, thereby constituting a
single property interest.38 Although a lease bonus has been judicially la-
beled as an "advance royalty,"39 the idea that the lease bonus is an in-
tegral part of the royalty interest is directly contrary to case precedents"
and seems untenable. There are several reasons why the lease bonus and
the royalty should be regarded as separate property interests. They have
independent termination dates. The royalty interests will terminate
when the lands covered by the lease cease to produce oil in paying quanti-
ties41 or the lessee abandons the lease.42 The lease bonus payments will
be paid in stipulated amounts at stipulated intervals for a specified period
of time, regardless of the amount of oil produced, and whether or not
there is any production at all. 3 Thus, it is possible that the royalty in-
terest can terminate either before, at the same time as, or after the lease
bonus payments have run out, depending on the supply of oil and the
lessee's willingness to extract it. By necessity, a single property interest
35. 14 B.T.A. 983 (1929).
36. 47 B.T.A. 649 (1942). Petitioners conveyed in trust for the benefit of their
children one-half of their interest in the Lazy 9 Ranch, including the royalties arising
from outstanding oil leases. However, petitioners retained the full cash bonuses which
they had received at the time of each lease, no part of them being assigned to the trustee.
37. See Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
38. See Comment, IX OIL & GAs TAx Q. 124-27 (1960).
39. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932). See also G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 Cum.
BULL. 214.
40. R. B. Cowden, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1148 (1950), appeal dismissed pursuant
to compromise, 202 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Alice G. K. Kleberg, 2 T.C. 1024 (1943),
nonacq., 1952-1 Cum. BULL. 5; Alice G. K. Kleberg, 43 B.T.A. 277 (1941), nvnacq.,
1952-1 Cum'. BULL. 5; J. M. Hudson, 14 B.T.A. 983 (1929).
41. See Martz & Hames, supra note 12.
42. Cf., Ellis v. Brown, 177 F.2d 677 (6th Cir. 1949). See generally SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF OIL AND GAS LAW 194-96 (1955).
43. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
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can have only one termination date. Since there are two independent
periods involved here, there must be two separate interests. Therefore,
conveyance of a royalty, or fractional part thereof, with a retained lease
bonus does not constitute a carve-out, because it does not result in an
interest of lesser quality being created out of a larger continuing interest.
Such a conveyance is the transfer of a separate property interest, which
should qualify as a capital transaction.
Conveyance of a royalty interest with a retained lease bonus fails to
meet two other tests which are characteristic of a carve-out. One, the
interest retained (lease bonus) is not one which is certain to continue
longer than the royalty interest conveyed. Thus, there is no larger con-
tinuing interest out of which an interest has been created. As a practical
matter, a lessee would not be willing to give the lessor an installment bo-
nus having a longer pay-out period than the duration of mineral produc-
tion. In any event it would be a mere fortuity for production to cease
before the bonus period has terminated. In every case where a convey-
ance has been found to be a carve-out, the retained greater interest out of
which the carve-out was created was certain to outlive the conveyed por-
tion.44 Otherwise, there can be no carve-out. Two, there is no definite
standard by which the interest conveyed can be reasonably ascertained.
In all cases in which a carve-out and thus an anticipatory assignment of
income is found to occur, the duration of the conveyed interest is rea-
sonably ascertainable by some definite standard, such as: until a specified
quantity of oil is produced; 5 for a specified period of time;" or until a
specified dollar amount has been accumulated. In the case of the con-
veyance of a royalty interest, or a fractional part thereof, with a retained
lease bonus, there is no definite standard by which the duration of the
conveyed interest can be reasonably ascertained. The interest conveyed
continues so long as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities, and this
period is most likely to extend beyond the period over which the lease
bonus payments are to be made.
CONVEYANCE OF LEASE BONUS WITH RETAINED ROYALTY
The lessor may decide to convey all or part of his lease bonus in-
44. See, e.g., Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
45. G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 CuM. BULL. 214; Hammonds & Ray, Oil Payments
Revisited, 33 TAXES, 349, n.9 (1955).
46. Ibid. See also 3. G. Dyer, 34 T.C. No. 51 (1960).
47. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Commissioner v.
Hawn, 231 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1956); Eugene T. Flewellen, 32 T.C. 317 (1959); G.C.M.
22730, supra note 45. See generally BREEDING & BURTON, TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS
INCOME § 2.07 (1954) ; Hammonds & Ray, sitpra note 45; Comment, Federal Taxation--
Sale of Carved Out Oil Payments, 30 RocKY MT. L. REv. 54 (1957).
NOTES
terest and retain the full royalty interest. There is authority for the
proposition that the assignment of a lessor's right to lease bonus pay-
ments constitutes the transfer of a separate property interest.4" There-
fore, the tax consequences of conveyance of a lease bonus, or a frac-
tional part thereof, should be the same as those of a like conveyance of a
royalty interest, as determined above,4" even though the entire royalty in-
terest is retained. The Internal Revenue Service has not acccpted the
holdings in the CowdeJ5 and Kleberg cases,"' which found that the sale
of the right to receive installment bonus payments results in capital gain.
The petitioners in the Kleberg cases1 2 owned what were in effect two dis-
tinct economic interests in the property, a royalty interest of one-eighth
of the future oil and gas production and a right to a series of installment
bonus payments extending over a period of years. They sold the install-
ment bonus interest to another royalty owner for a lump sum payable
part in one year and part in the next, retaining their full royalty interest.
The retention of the royalty interest did not prevent the conveyance of
the installment lease bonus from being a sale of a capital asset.5"
A bonus payment is not of itself an economic interest in oil and gas
in place."4 If a lease bonus is then regarded as a mere contract right, in
the nature of an account receivable for the purchase price of the lease, 5
its conveyance would not be a capital transaction, 6 even though a lease
bonus has been held to be a separate property interest." Tax Court de-
48. R. B. Cowden, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1148 (1950), appeal dismissed pursuant
to compromise, 202 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Alice G. K. Kleberg, 2 T.C. 1024 (1943),
nonacq., 1952-1 Co. BULL. 5; Alice G. K. Kleberg, 43 B.T.A. 277 (1941), wnoacq.,
1952-1 Cuax. BULL. 5; BREEDING & BURTON, op. cit. supra note 47, at 50. See Weeks,
Advantageous1 Methods of Handling the Purchase of Oil and Gas Properties, THuRD
ANN. INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 387, 388-93 (1952).
49. See text accompanying notes 33-34, supra.
50. R. B. Cowden, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1148 (1950), appeal dismissed pursuant to
compromise, 202 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1953).
51. Alice G. K. Kleberg, 2 T.C. 1024 (1943), nonacq., 1952-1 Cum. BULL. 5;
Alice G. K. Kleberg, 43 B.T.A. 277 (1941), nonacq., 1952-1 Cum. BULL. 5. See MONT-
GOMERY'S FEDERAL TAxES § 12.41 (37th ed. 1958).
52. Ibid.
53. See Kent, Tax Problems Affecting Lessors and Royalty Owners, FIRST ANN.
INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 355, 391-98 (1949).
54. See text accompanying notes 17-18, supra.
55. Cf. Glenn E. Alexander, 34 T.C. No. 78 (1960).
56. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(4).
57. Bennett v. Scofield, 170 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1948) (for purpose of inclusion in
gross estate). For purposes of depletion, under the statutory language it seems that
the royalty and lease bonus would be regarded as a "single property" because they,
although two mineral interests, are included in a single tract or parcel of land. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 614(b); G.C.M. 24094, 1944 Cuf. BULL. 250, todifying G.C.M. 22106,
1941-1 Cum. BULL. 245; G.C.M. 17760, 1937-1 Cum. BULL. 102. But see Helvering v.
Jewel Mining Co., 126 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1942) (Taxpayer mined coal under a mineral
lease from one portion of a tract, and subleased another portion of the same tract,.
reserving a royalty. Taxpayer was not allowed to group royalty income with income
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cisions,5" however, do recognize that a sale of a lease bonus constitutes
a sale of a property right which is a capital asset. Thus, it appears that
capital gains treatment should be afforded the lessor who sells his lease
bonus interest. Moreover, a donative transfer of his lease bonus in-
terests by the lessor should be effective to relieve him of any further
income tax liability upon the receipt of the payments by the grantee.
The big question now, however, is whether the courts will continue to
allow capital gains treatment in this area since the decision of the Su-
preme Court in Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc. 9 It may be that the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue has evoked a change in judicial policy
and attitude toward the recognition of capital gains as a tax minimizing
device. A further question is, then, how far will the Commissioner and
the courts go, under the Lake case, in denying capital gains treatment to
the sale or exchange of mineral interests.
THE LAKE CASE AND ITS BROAD APPLICATION
In Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc.,"° the Supreme Court consoli-
dated five decisions"' of the Fifth Circuit involving the taxability as capi-
tal gain or depletable income in the year of sale of the amounts received
in consideration for production payments carved out of both operating
and non-operating interests. Petitioner in the Lake case was indebted to
its president in the amount of $600,000. In consideration of the cancel-
lation of that indebtedness, petitioner assigned to the president twenty-
five per cent of its seven-eighths working interest in two oil and gas
leases, entitling him to receive that portion of all production from the
leases, until he had received $600,000 plus an amount equal to three per
from production on the area it mined for the purpose of taking percentage depletion and
avoiding the fifty per cent limitation) ; French, The Oil and Gas Property and Aggrega-
tion, 36 TEXAS L. REv. 745 (1958). The percentage depletion allowance, INT. REv. CoDE
or 1954, § 613, and the net income limitation, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 613(a), must be
computed separately for each economic interest held by the taxpayer. Vinton Petroleum
.Co. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 601 (1934);
G.C.M. 22956, 1941-2 Cum. BULL. 103. However, a lease bonus is not itself an economic
interest in gas and oil in place, even though regarded as advance royalty and subject
to depletion. See text accompanying notes 17-18, 54, supra.
58. R. B. Cowden, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Men. 1148 (1950), appeal dismissed pursuant
to compromise, 202 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Alice G. K. Kleberg, 2 T.C. 1024 (1943),
nonacq., 1952-1 Cum. BULL. 5; Alice G. K. Kleberg, 43 B.T.A. 277 (1941), nonacq.,
1952-1 Cums. BULL. 5.
59. 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
60. Ibid.
61. Scofield v. O'Connor, 241 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1957); Commissioner v. Weed, 241
F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 241 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1957) ;
Fleming v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Commissioner v. Wrather, 241
.F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1957).
NOTES
cent a year payable monthly on the unpaid balance.12  The Supreme Court
held that although oil payments are interests in land, the consideration
received for these oil payment rights was taxable as ordinary income sub-
ject to depletion. The Court reasoned that if one entitled to receive at a
future date interest on a bond or compensation for services, makes a
grant of it by anticipatory assignment, he realizes taxable income as if he
had collected the interest or received salary and then paid it over.63 Quot-
ing from Helvering v. Horst,64 the Court stated:
The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or in-
vestment and obtained the satisfaction of his desires whether he
collects and uses the income to procure those satisfactions, or
whether he disposes of his right to collect it as the means of
procuring them. 5
The Court concluded that in the Lake case, even more clearly than in
Helvering v. Horst,66 the taxpayer was converting future income into
present income. The far-reaching dictum of the Supreme Court is to the
effect that a taxpayer cannot convert into capital gain, that which would
have been received in the form of ordinary income at some time in the
future, apparently disregarding the conventional "fruit and tree" con-
cept."' The Lake case emphasized that the "consideration was-paid for
the right to receive future income, not for an increase in the value of the
income-producing property."68  The substance of what was assigned, not
62. "At the time of the assignment it could have been estimated with reasonable
accuracy that the assigned oil payment right would pay out in three or more years. It
did in fact pay out in a little over three years." Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356
U.S. 260, 262. "The Wrather case has some variations in its facts. In the O'Connor case
the assignors of the oil payments owned royalty interests rather than working interests."
Ibid. "The Weed case is different only because it involves sulphur rights, rather than
oil rights." Ibid. And in the Fleming case, "oil payment assignments were made, not
for cash but for real estate." Id. at 263. "But these differences are not material to the
question . . . for decision." Id. at 262.
63. 356 U.S. at 267.
64. 311 U.S. 112, 117 (1940).
65. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 267 (1958). In Helvering v.
Horst, supra note 64, the rule was established that the holder of a right to income is
taxed whether he receives the income directly or diverts it elsewhere for his own benefit.
In the Horst case the assignor clipped interest coupons from bonds he owned and gave
them to his son. The Court held this to be an anticipatory assignment of income,
taxable to the assignor because he had exercised his control over this income and
realized the benefit of its disposition. Where, however, the assignor conveys his
interest in and control of the property which produces the income, there is a transfer
of a capital asset. See Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
66. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
67. See, e.g., Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) ; Phillips v. Commissioner,
275 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1960) ; Arnfeld v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 865 (Ct. Cl. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 943 (1959).
68. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 266 (1958).
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the form of transparent device employed will control.69
The Lake case holds, and the Revenue Service has officially adopted
the view,"9 that the conveyance of a fractional interest extending over the
entire life of the larger royalty interest or oil payment from which it is
severed constitutes a carved-out oil payment. The consideration receiv-
ed therefrom, if the transaction is a sale, must be reported as ordinary
income, on the theory that the assignor has made an anticipatory assign-
ment of income.7 ' In the case of a gift, the donor would be required to
include the payments in his gross income as they are received by the
donee on the same theory."2 The Lake case finally settled a conflict of
many years duration." Several cases have held that the conveyance of a
carved-out oil payment was a conveyance of a property interest,7 and
thus, are apparently overruled by implication by the Supreme Court's
holding in the Lake case. Other cases, which held the conveyance of a
carved-out oil payment to be an anticipatory assignment of income,"
have received the final stamp of approval by the Supreme Court in the
Lake case, which is now the law on this issue.
69. Ibid.
70. I. T. 4003, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 10, 11 quoted in Commissioner v. P. G. Lake,
Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 265-66, n.5 (1958), states in part as follows:
After careful study and considerable experience with the application of G.C.M.
24849, supra [1946-1 Cum. BULL. 66], it is now concluded that there is no
legal or practical basis for distinguishing between short-lived and long-lived in-
oil payment rights. It is, therefore, the present position of the Bureau that the
assignment of any in-oil payment right (not pledged for development), which
extends over a period less than the life of the depletable property interest from
which it is carved, is essentially the assignment of expected income from such
property interest. Therefore, the assignment for a consideration of any such
in-oil payment right results in the receipt of ordinary income by the assignor
which is taxable to him when received or accrued, depending upon the method
of accounting employed by him. Where the assignment of the in-oil payment
right is donative, the transaction is considered as an assignment of future income
which is taxable to the donor at such time as the income from the assigned
payment right arises.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, G.C.M. 24849, supra, and I.T. 3935 supra
[1949-1 Cum. BULL. 39], do not apply where the assigned in-oil payment right
constitutes the entire depletable interest of the assignor in the property or a
fraction extending over the entire life of the property.
71. Accord, Commissioner v. Hawn, 231 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1956); Commissioner
v. Slagter, 238 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1956).
72. Eugene T. Flewellen, 32 T.C. 317 (1959). See also, note 34, supra.
73. See Benjamin and Currier, The Supreme Court and Taxation of Oil, Gas and
Production Payments: The Lake Cases, 19 LA. L. Rxv. 579 (1959), for a detailed dis-
cussion of this conflict and its historical development.
74. Caldwell v. Campbell, 218 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1955); Lester A. Nordan, 22
T.C. 1132 (1954), acq., in result only, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 4, ioni-acq., 1955-2 Curs. BULL.
11 withdrawn; Majestic Oil Co., 42 B.T.A. 659 (1940), acq., 1940-2 Cub!. BULL. 5;
Ortiz Oil Co., 37 B.T.A. 656 (1938), aff'd, 102 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1939) ; R. E. Nail,
27 B.T.A. 33 (1932), inoacq., 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 6.
75. Commissioner v. Hawn, 231 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Commissioner v. Slagter,
238 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1956).
NOTES
The Lake case on its facts and I.T. 4003' by its terms are not ap-
plicable to the conveyance of a royalty with a retained lease bonus, or vice
versa. These authorities do not apply to the assignment of a depletable
interest, or a fractional part thereof, extending over the entire life of the
interest. Therefore, it would seem that the lessor could convy the entire
or any fractional part of his lease bonus interest for the remainder of its
duration without being affected adversely by the decision in the Lake
case. But if, despite the distinguishing factors between the Lake case and
the type of conveyances contemplated above, it is found that such a trans-
action constitutes an anticipatory assignment of income, and not the
transfer of a property interest, the lease bonus payments will be includ-
ible in the donor's gross income as they are received by the donee, in the
case of a gift, and the consideration received, in the case of a sale, will
be ordinary income, not capital gain.
THE "SUBSTITUTION" THEORY
Later cases,77 applying the "substitution" theory of the Lake case,"8
also cast doubt on how this type of transaction will be regarded by the
courts. Under the "substitution" theory, the court may find that where
one has conveyed in exchange for a lump-sum consideration what would
over a period of years normally be ordinary income, he will not be al-
lowed to report such lump-sum payment as capital gain, thereby substi-
tuting capital gain for ordinary income. In Arnfeld v. United States,7"
the Court of Claims held that income realized from the transfer of an
annuity policy prior to its maturity was taxable as ordinary income. The
court stated "the issue here becomes one of whether the plaintiffs can
convert what would in time constitute ordinary income . . . into taxable
gain.' 's In discussing the Lake case and the plaintiffs' asserted distinc-
tion the court commented that the transfer of plaintiffs' entire ownership
in the income-producing capital asset was not dispositive of the case.
"The Supreme Court has indicated that the concept of 'property' is not
necessarily controlling in matters of taxation.""1  The taxpayer in Com-
missioner v. Phillips,8 2 sold an endowment policy twelve days prior to its
76. 1950-1 Cums. BuLL. 10.
77. See, e.g, Phillips v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1960); Arnfeld v.
United States, 163 F. Supp. 865 (Ct. Cl. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 943 (1959).
78. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 265 (1958).
79. 163 F. Supp. 865 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
80. Id. at 870.
81. Ibid., citing Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941), which held that
consideration received for cancellation of a lease was not a return of capital and was
ordinary income, even thought the lease was "property."
82. 275 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1960).
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maturity and treated the excess received by him over and above the cost
of the policy as capital gain. The Tax Court83 held in favor of the tax-
payer, but the Court of Appeals reversed,84 adopting the view in accord-
ance with the Lake case that the lump-sum payment received by the tax-
payer was essentially a "substitute" for what would otherwise be received
at a future time as ordinary income. The Court of Appeals said that the
taxpayer's argument that the endowment policy was "property" and as
such was subject only to capital gains treatment did not necessarily fol-
low. "That it was 'property' in the broad sense of the word does not
satisfy the requirements of the law for capital gains purposes.""
On this basis it may be held that a lessor by conveying his lease
bonus to the grantee is substituting capital gain for ordinary income and
will be required to report the consideration received as ordinary income.
Further, in the case of a gift, the lessor may be regarded as merely mak-
ing an anticipatory assignment of income and therefore taxable on the
bonus payments as they are received by the donee. But even though the
Lake case was explicitly followed in Estate of 0. W. Killam,s" which the
court held involved a carved-out oil payment, the court significantly
stated by way of dictum that ". . . this conclusion does not apply where
the assigned right constitutes the entire depletable interest of the assignor
in the property or a fraction extending over the entire life of the prop-
erty.""7  As pointed out previously," a lease bonus has been held to be a
83. 30 T.C. 866 (1958).
84. 275 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1960).
85. Id. at 35, citing Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941). It should be
noted that the taxpayer in the Phillips case is a tax attorney practicing in Washington,
D.C., and he made the conveyance of the endowment policy to his partners only twelve
days before the policy was to mature, thereby giving the appearance, as the court may
have taken it, as a sham.
86. 33 T.C. 345 (1959). Compare Estate of 0. W. Killam, supra, with Wither-
spoon v. United States, 52 Am. FED. TAx R. 1836 (N.D. Tex. 1956). In Killam, the
taxpayer transferred an oil lease reserving two production payments: one out of seventy-
five per cent of seven-eighths of the oil produced until $150,000 with interest was received
and thereafter out of eighty per cent of seven-eighths of the oil produced until an
additional $200,000 with interest was received. The taxpayer immediately sold the
$150,000 oil payment for its face value. The Tax Court held that the sale of the first
oil payment was in effect a "carve-out" of a $150,000 interest from a larger $350,000
interest. The proceeds received were, therefore, ordinary income subject to depletion.
In the Witherspoon case, the taxpayer assigned an oil lease reserving two production
payments: one in the amount of $475,000 payable out of forty-six per cent of oil
produced, and the other in the amount of $800,000 payable out of twenty-nine per cent
of production. The smaller, faster-paying interest was sold, and the larger, slower-
paying interest was retained. The court held the taxpayer acquired two separate
property interests, one of which was sold and the other retained. The transaction,
therefore, was entitled to capital gains treatment. Here, the oil payments ran con-
currently whereas in the Killam; case they were successive. Royalty and lease-bonus
interests also run concurrently, not successively.
87. 33 T.C. at 348.
88. See text accompanying notes 48-52, supra.
NOTES
separate property. Metropolitan Bldg. Co.,89 bears a close analogy to the
assignment of the remaining payments under a lease bonus agreement.
The question presented to the court was whether a transfer of the re-
maining portion of a lease (about ten months) by the lessor to a third
person resulted in capital gain or ordinary income. The Tax Court held
that the transfer of the leasehold constituted a sale of property and not
an assignment of future income, and therefore resulted in capital gain.
The Lake case was distinguished by the court as follows:
In that case [Lake] there was neither a transfer of a taxpayer's
entire interest nor was there a transfer of a portion of that in-
terest having a remaining life equal to the life of the interest
retained. . . . Presumably, if a portion of the entire interest
had been transferred for the entire life of that interest, the
respondent [Commissioner] would not have attempted to tax
the gain as ordinary income. See I.T. 4003, 1950-1 C.B. 10,
11. The [Metropolitan Bldg. Co.] case is clearly distinguish-
able.. . . The lease in question is clearly a substantial property
right. Nor do the principles enunciated in Helvering v. Horst,
supra, [311 U.S. 112 (1940)] aid the respondent here.9"
CONCLUSION
The conveyance of all or a fractional part of a royalty interest by a
lessor should, therefore, be regarded as the transfer of a separate prop-
erty interest, resulting in capital gain upon a sale and effective to pre-
vent further inclusion in his gross income in the case of a gift, despite
the retention of the right to lease bonus payments. It is highly probable,
however, that in spite of the case precedents and the above analysis, the
Commissioner will litigate the question of the effectiveness of a gift or
capital gains claimed on the conveyance of installment lease bonus pay-
ments.9 It seems inevitable, on the basis of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc.,9 2 that the courts will hold in
favor of the Commissioner as to the conveyance of a lease bonus being
89. 31 T.C. 971 (1959), acq., 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 6, rev'd other grounds, 282
F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1960).
90. 31 T.C. at 980.
91. See MONTGOMERY'S FEDERAL TAXES § 12.41 (37th ed. 1958). "The statement
has been made and repeated that whenever a method is discovered whereby the con-
version of ordinary business income into capital gain is coupled with retention of the
business itself, the Internal Revenue Service will ultimately succeed in changing the law.
This theory has proved true at least in the history of the tax treatment of carved-out
oil payments." Benjamin and Currier, supra note 73, at 579. See also Hammonds &
Ray, Oil Payments Revisited, 33 TAXES 349, 352, n.24 (1955).
92. 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
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an anticipatory assignment of income." The courts, however, should
never go so far as to use the "substitution" theory of the Lake case to
deny an effective gift or capital gains treatment to the conveyance of the
entire or vertical slice of a royalty interest."' In fact, a strong argument
can be made that the application of the Lake case should not be extended
into the area of lease bonus conveyances. It would appear to be some-
what of an anomaly if the Commissioner and the courts maintain their
present position that conveyance of the entire or vertical-slice of a royalty
with a retained lease bonus is not a carve-out, but a capital transaction;
and still tax the conveyance of the entire or a proportionate interest in a
lease bonus, with or without a retained royalty, as an anticipatory assign-
ment of income, under the authority of the Lake case. In either instance,
the result is the conversion into capital gain of what would be received as
ordinary income at a future time; in both instances, a separate depletable
interest, a property, not a carve-out, is conveyed.
MECHANICS LIENS IN INDIANA-THE EXTENT OF THE
PROPERTY AND PROPERTY INTERESTS SUBJECT
TO THE LIEN
The mechanic's lien is a security device to insure the mechanic or
materialman the debt owed for work performed or materials furnished
for the erection, improvement, or repair of buildings or other structures
on real property. The right of the mechanic or materialman to such a
lien was a remedy unknown to the common law, and exists today only by
virtue of statute.'
These statutes first appeared in the United States at the beginning
of the 19th century.2 Their origin is traced by some to the need for a
simple and effective debt remedy in a growing nation which emphasized
mechanical and industrial pursuits.3 For the first one hundred years of
this new remedy's existence a great amount of attention was given it by
both legal writers and state legislatures. Since the turn of this century,
however, very little has been written on mechanic's liens. This note is
93. But cf., Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 31 T.C. 971 (1959), acq., 1959-2 Cuu. BULL.
6, rev'd on other grounds, 282 F 2d 592 (9th Cir. 1960).
94. See Galvin, The "Ought" and "Is" of Oil and Gas Taxation, 73 HARV. L. RaV.
1441, 1505-06 (1960).
1. See, e.g., National Brick Co. v. Russel, 99 Ind. App. 53, 190 N.E. 614 (1934).
2. PHILIPS, MECHANiCS' LIEN S § 1-12 (3d ed. 1893).
3. Id. § 6.
